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ABSTRACT. While there are both successes and
challenges related to the use of interstate water compacts,
in their most effective forms, they allow states to take a
comprehensive, holistic approach to water management.
Successful compacts tend to encompass the natural
hydrologic boundaries of the water basin. They are more
likely to utilize a commission type governance structure
with sufficient authority to carry out the mission and
goals of the compacting agreement. Successful compacts
are flexible and allow for future developments (including
climate change) while being cognizant of the need to
protect and enhance the environment. They are also
sensitive to the needs and desires of various stakeholders,
including federal, state, and local governments as well as
non-governmental organizations.
Water compacts also face a variety of challenges. They
must answer to a wide and diverse constituent base, often
with conflicting interests. Stronger states can and do
attempt to “bully” other states, severely limiting or
eliminating altogether the usefulness of the compact.
Governance structures that fail to integrate the interests
of both states into a single body simply make the
compact into an arena where small scale water wars can
be fought.

INTRODUCTION
Of the fifty states that comprise the United
States of America, only two – Alaska and
Hawaii—do not share a ground or surface water
resource with another state. Accordingly…the
forty-eight contiguous states fall into one of two
categories: those states that are (or have been)
involved in an interstate water conflict or those
states that are going to be involved in an
interstate water conflict (Sherk, 2005, p.765).
That statement was made nearly ten years ago. Since
then, increasing population, climate change and new
technologies are putting even more pressure on water
resources. States are having to re-evaluate how they

manage these assets, both intrastate and those that are
shared with neighboring states. As part of this process,
state officials need to develop a clear picture of what
future needs and conflicts may emerge and how these
might be mitigated. They also need to prepare flexible
mechanisms for dealing with the uncertainty that
accompanies almost any planning effort. Without the
means to successfully address transboundary water
issues, options are limited and too often result in
undesirable outcomes.
The purpose of this paper is to examine federalinterstate compacts as a possible solution to both existing
and emerging issues related to shared water resources. It
provides an overview of the advantages and challenges of
utilizing interstate compacts as well as giving examples
of compacts that have experienced various rates of
success. The paper concludes with the possibility of a
future compact for the Savannah River Basin.
The information in this paper is especially relevant for
those who are charged with providing solutions to
problems emerging from shared water resources. It
provides an alternative to piecemeal administration that
is not equipped to deal with problems that require the
broad participation of other parties to solve. Overall,
this paper illustrates a mechanism that allows for
extensive
stakeholder
participation
within
a
comprehensive, flexible framework that has been shown
to work in complex transboundary water resource
situations.

INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS
Interstate compacts are authorized under Article 1,
§10, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution as a means for
states to enter into agreements that might affect federal
prerogatives. This clause benefits the federal
government, relieving it of responsibility for problems
better left to the province of states. At the same time, it
allows states to exercise authority over issues within their
purview while still providing a method for states and the
federal government to “solve mutual problems in a

collective fashion” (Kearney & Stucker, 1985, p. 210).
There are compacts to address any number of issues
(Florestano, 1994; Frankfurter & Landis, 1925) but, as
discussed here, compacts are cooperative agreements for
sharing transboundary water resources. Compacts are
negotiated by member states, ratified by state
legislatures, sent to Congress for ratification, and signed
into law by the President. After Congressional approval,
a compact cannot be unilaterally amended or appealed by
any of the signatory parties. Compacts are binding on all
citizens of the participating states and if the terms of the
compact are not honored, the injured party can bring suit
in state or federal court (Florestano, 1994; Frankfurter &
Landis, 1925).
Compacts can be relatively simple or they can be
comprehensive documents that can consist of nearly
unlimited combinations of goals, purposes, and
organizational structures (Frankfurter & Landis, 1925).
Compacts provide a principle means by which states can
allocate water from common river systems, they help
provide for efficient use and equitable apportionment of
shared resources and they serve to administer rules and
develop strategies to insure compliance (Schlager &
Heikkila, 2009).
There are two types of interstate compacts. The first is
a compact between states, ratified by the states’
legislatures and by Congress but without the federal
government as an active participant. In the second type,
the federal-interstate compact, the federal government is
an active member of the compact. There are currently
seven federal-interstate compacts; four of which deal
with transboundary water resource issues (Zimmerman,
2012).
SUCCESSFUL INTERSTATE COMPACTS
Successful interstate water compacts share certain
characteristics. For example, viable compacts must be
able to meet and negotiate changing conditions;
therefore, they must be designed with flexibility in mind.
Successful compacts are often those specifically created
for individual circumstances. Successful compacts are
those that can be implemented with few external
constraints. Another plus for successful compacts is that
they routinely involve water resource management
experts who have a better understanding of technical
data, long-term outcomes, and different available options
(Tarlock, cited in Stephenson, 2000).
Many successful compacts utilize commissions as a
major element of their governance structure (Mandarano,
Featherstone, & Paulsen, 2008). These commissions are,
as Stephenson (2000) says, “…how interstate water
compacts make their greatest contribution to water
resource management” (p.99). These permanent

commissions provide authority and structure for the
agreements (Stephenson, 2000), gather information, meet
and discuss water problems, develop regulations to
administer compacts, monitor water use, and mediate
conflict (Schlager & Heikkila, 2009). Compact
commissions also allow for the participation of
stakeholders in decision making and for transparency in
processes and outcomes (See the Delaware River Basin
Compact, 1961). Compacts are also useful in promoting
and maintaining relations between states themselves and
between states and the federal government. Comity, or as
Professor Dan Taylor of Colorado State University
describes it, “the need for courtesy and respect when
negotiating among equals” (McClurg, 1997, p. 6) is an
essential element in building collaborative water
partnerships.
Adequate boundaries are also essential for the success
of water compacts. No matter what the measure,
excellent management in one state can be nullified by
poor management in adjacent states sharing the same
river basin (Dellapenna, 2006). Therefore, interstate
management within the hydrological boundaries of a
river basin is substantially more likely to succeed than
management utilizing political boundaries.
The Delaware River Basin Compact
The Delaware River Basin Compact (DRBC), the first
federal-interstate compact developed, has emerged as a
model compact (Dellapenna, 2006; Zimmerman, 2012).
In this compact, participating states acknowledge not
only the realities of future population growth and
development but the interrelatedness of water resources
and the need to work together to resolve the issues that
affect them all. The DRBC also recognizes the
overarching importance of allocating water equitably,
without regard for artificially imposed borders; “…to
apply the principle of equal and uniform treatment to all
water users who are similarly situated and to all users of
related facilities, without regard to established political
boundaries” (emphasis added) (Delaware River Basin
Compact, 2009, Article 1, § 1.3, ¶ (e)).
One of the major strengths of this compact is that it is
administered by a commission with broad powers to
carry out its responsibilities. These powers include the
critical ability to borrow money and issue bonds, giving
the commission the wherewithal to maintain a necessary
amount of independence. Other successful aspects of the
DRBC include the ability to aid in the coordination and
integration of federal, state, municipal, and private
agencies and the development of a comprehensive plan
addressing both immediate and long range water resource
needs (Delaware River Basin Compact, 2009). The
success of the DRBC was such that, in 1970, it became
the template for the Susquehanna River Basin Compact
(SRBC) (Dellapenna, 2006).

COMPACTING CHALLENGES
Compacts can and do fail. There are a variety of
barriers to developing and implementing successful
interstate water compacts. There are often diverse
cultural, political, historic and economic priorities that
each group brings to the negotiations. Parties to these
types of agreements must often cooperate and collaborate
with others of widely divergent interests (Mulroy, 2008).
Developing and implementing an interstate compact
can be a complicated, expensive, and time consuming
project (Meyers cited in Stephenson, 2000). Because of
often substantial federal interests in the areas covered by
these compacts, these agreements must also account for
the participation of these and other stakeholders
(Mandarano et al., 2008; Sherk, 2005). In addition, lack
of accurate data and faulty or no planning for future
development can threaten to derail elements of a compact
years down the road (McClurg, 1997).
The ACT and ACF Compacts
The Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa (ACT) and the
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) compacts are
examples of failed efforts to find a solution to a growing
water crisis. Although deadlines were extended several
times, the states were unable to reach a compromise and
no effective compact has emerged (Dellapenna, 2006).
This failure can be attributed to several problems
associated with water compacts. Primarily, the states
relentlessly protected their own interests and failed to
negotiate in good faith (Mandarano et al., 2008;
Stephenson, 2000). In addition, these compacts (ACT &
ACF) lacked many of the attributes that made the DRBC
and the SRBC so effective (Dellapenna, 2006). For
example, while the DRBC Commission has the power to
allocate waters to and among the compact states and to
impose conditions, the ACT/ACF Commission was
limited to planning, coordinating, monitoring, and
making recommendations concerning the water resources
of the basin (Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin
Compact, 1997; Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River
Basin Compact, 1997; Delaware River Basin Compact,
2009). Another problem with the ACF compact centers
on the treatment of federal agencies (Dellapenna, 2006).
Given the huge federal expenditures in the basin, in
excess of $1.5 billion just for the Army Corps of
Engineers, the proposed compact called only for minimal
federal participation, an unacceptable situation for the
U.S. Department of Justice (Reno cited in Sherk, 2005).
The Colorado River Compact
Not the stunning success of the Delaware River Basin
Compact nor the abysmal failure of the ACT/ACF, the
1922 Colorado River Compact continues to be a source
of controversy. However, the number and scope of

“agreements, contracts, treaties, laws, and court
decisions” (McClurg, 1997, p.7) that make up “the law of
the river” governing the Colorado today, indicate that
there was a great deal of ground not covered in the
original compact. These topics include environmental
issues, increasing development, growing water shortages,
water transfers, the rights of Native Americans to water,
and a possible dispute with Mexico over water promised
by treaty in 1944.
Other Challenges
Other problem spots for water resource management
include the Great Lakes and the Catawba River between
North and South Carolina. Although the Great Lakes
Basin Compact has been revised to reflect fears of
predatory interbasin transfers, it still lacks a strong
commission with adequate authority. On the Catawba, it
appears that neither state is willing to compact and
disputes have already erupted, lessening the chance of a
viable compact in the near future (Dyckman, 2008).
A SAVANNAH RIVER COMPACT?
The Savannah River begins in North Carolina, forms
the boundary between Georgia and South Carolina and
empties into the Atlantic at the port of Savannah. The
river basin has a number of important issues that will
either require cooperative efforts between the states or
may escalate into litigation. Among these are water
quality issues, drought issues, economic development
and population growth, fish and wildlife issues,
regulatory issues and the Savannah Harbor Expansion
Project (Georgia Environmental Protection Division &
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
Control, n.d.; Savannah River Basin Advisory Council,
n.d.).
South Carolina’s Approach to the Savannah River
Basin
In a 2004 report, the Governor’s Water Law Review
Committee (GWLRC) supported a compact with Georgia
as a viable method to apportion the resources of the
Savannah River Basin. However, while recognizing that
both states have an interest in the entire river and that
there is a need for consistency between the states in areas
such as water quality standards and FERC relicensing
(Governor's Water Law Review Committee, 2004), it
does not appear that there are any recommendations for a
strong, resilient, basin-wide governing body similar to
those found in more successful water compacts. In fact,
the GWLRC specifically suggests that the compact
utilize various protocols that would “obligate each state
to manage its basin resources in a consistent manner”
(Governor's Water Law Review Committee, 2004, p.24)
but carefully avoids any commitment to common

governance. That being said, the GWLRC has
highlighted a number of elements that may contribute to
the development and ratification of a successful
Savannah River Compact.
When discussing the allocation of the usable water, the
Committee acknowledges the many stakeholders
involved, including the significant role of the Army
Corps of Engineers (USACE or CoE) and other federal
agencies. In case of drought, cooperation and
coordination with the CoE will be essential since they
control significant resources on the river. Another
positive element from the GWLRC report is the
recognition of the importance of accurate data. Unlike
the Colorado River Compact, where the river was overallocated from the beginning, having a realistic estimate
of the available water supply can only enhance the
working of any compact that may emerge.
The GWLRC proposal also advocates addressing the
looming issue of interbasin transfers. It specifically notes
that while Greenville and Beaufort-Jasper together are
permitted to access 210 million gallons per day from the
basin, Georgia also has the potential for a very large
transfer from the Savannah. Again, inclusion of the CoE,
who also oversees a major supplier of water to Atlanta,
Lake Lanier, can, at the very least increase the scope,
accuracy and reliability of the knowledge available and
significantly improve any compacting efforts.
Although the GWLRC acknowledges that various state
and federal agencies with interests in the environment
conduct activities within the Savannah River Basin, there
is no evidence of real concern about the environment
itself. The only mention of the Clean Water Act is related
to FERC relicensing and there is one mention of
endangered species. In reality, the Clean Water Act and
the Endangered Species Act will impact the way states
will manage the Savannah River resources. The possible
consequences of these laws must be incorporated into
any viable compact.
The 2004 South Carolina Water Plan (Badr, Wachob,
& Gellici) supports the development of a compact
between the state and others that share water resources.
“Compacts”, the authors point out, “will promote
interstate coordination, reduce potential disputes between
the states, enhance the flow regime of many of South
Carolina’s rivers and extend the availability of water
during severe droughts (p. vi).
Georgia’s Approach to the Savannah River Basin
Like its South Carolina counterpart, the Georgia
Comprehensive State-wide Water Management Plan
(Georgia Environmental Protection Division, 2008)
recognizes the need for flexibility, the importance of
including various stakeholders, and the need for relevant
and accurate data. However, unlike the South Carolina
plan, there is no mention of the possibility of a compact

or any coordinated effort with South Carolina regarding
the Savannah River.
A Bi-state Approach
A recent development, the Savannah River Basin
Water Caucus is composed of legislators from counties
on both sides of the river. A major purpose of the Caucus
is to avoid lengthy and costly litigation between the
states as South Carolina threatens action against Georgia
over water allocation. While there has been mention of
an interstate water compact for the Savannah Basin
(Cary, 2013), it is too early in the process to determine if
this option will actually reach the Caucus’ agenda

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Water compacts can be an optimal method for dealing
with impending “water wars.” Compacts allow states to
avoid the time and expense of litigation, the possibly
capricious nature of legislative apportionment, and most
importantly, compacts allow states to have input into the
process that is not present in litigation or legislative
apportionment (Kerwin, 2005). In federal-interstate water
compacts, the combined resources of the federal and state
governments provide nearly unlimited possibilities for
action (Frankfurter & Landis, 1925). In addition,
compacts are versatile and can be configured to address
almost any number of current and future situations.
Developing a compact can be a long and complex
process. The time to start is now. The Savannah River
Basin Water Caucus can initiate a substantive dialogue
between Georgia and South Carolina officials that can
lead to a workable and sustainable federal-interstate
water compact for the Savannah River.
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